Phillip L. Greenblatt, Defendant-Cross-Claimant-Cross-Defendant-Appellant, Sonja Rosenbaum, individually and as distributee of the Estate of Alphons Rosenbaum, Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Cross-Defendant, Estate of Rose Eisinger, Gladys Robinson, Defendants.
AMENDED SUMMARY ORDER
Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and this court's Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a document filed with this court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an electronic database (with the notation "summary order"). A party citing a summary order must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 5th day of March, two thousand fourteen.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Frederick Block, Senior District Judge; Tucker L. Melançon, District Judge).
FOR APPELLANT: Thomas A. Cullen, Burke, Scolamiero, Mortati & Hurd, LLP, Albany, NY.
FOR APPELLEE: Stephen M. Harnik, Harnik Law Firm, New York, NY.
PRESENT: RICHARD C. WESLEY, PETER W. HALL, DENNY CHIN, Circuit Judges.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York is AFFIRMED.
On February 20, 2013, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Melançon, J.) entered an amended judgment in favor of appellee Pensionsversicherungsanstalt ("Pva") against appellant Phillip L. Greenblatt ("Greenblatt") and co-defendant Sonja Rosenbaum. Greenblatt's present appeal challenges a February 5, 2010 denial of Greenblatt's Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 motion for summary judgment and an August 23, 2011 denial of Greenblatt's Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c) motion to dismiss on the pleadings. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues for review.
After trial, appellants ordinarily may not challenge the denial of a summary judgment motion premised on a finding that genuine issues of material fact exist. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Jordan, 131 S.Ct. 884, 889 (2011); Pahuta v. Massey- Ferguson, Inc., 170 F.3d 125, 130 (2d Cir. 1999). Here, although Greenblatt alleges that the district court failed to follow Rule 56.1(d), conceivably a legal claim, the argument effectively reduces to a sufficiency challenge based on the claim that Pva failed to submit admissible evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. Because the issues raised in the motion for summary judgment were fully tried before a jury, we will not review the district court's decision to deny Greenblatt's motion for summary judgment.
In any event, Greenblatt's argument in this regard is without merit. Local Rule 56.1(d) mandates that "each statement . . . must be followed by citation to evidence which would be admissible, " a standard that Pva failed to meet in multiple instances. However, nothing requires a district court to deem evidence admitted, or grant summary judgment, simply because a non-movant fails to comply with local rules such as Local Rule 56.1. See Holtz v. Rockefeller & Co., Inc., 258 F.3d 62, 73 (2d Cir. 2001) ("A district court has broad discretion to determine whether to overlook a party's failure to comply with local court rules."). The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying Greenblatt's motion for summary judgment.
Greenblatt also argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for judgment on the pleadings. Specifically, Greenblatt alleges that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Pva failed to satisfy the $75, 000 amount in controversy requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
To determine whether the amount in controversy requirement is met, "we measure the amount in controversy as of the date of the complaint." Scherer v. Equitable Life Assurance Socʹy of U.S., 347 F.3d 394, 397 (2d Cir. 2003); see also Wolde-Meskel v. Vocational Instruction Project Cmty. Servs., Inc., 166 F.3d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 1999) ("Satisfaction of the § 1332(a) diversity requirements (amount in controversy and citizenship) is determined as of the date that suit is filed – the 'time-of-filing' rule."). And because subject matter jurisdiction cannot be ousted once it has attached, "affirmative defenses asserted on the merits may not be used to whittle down the amount in controversy." Scherer, 347 F.3d at 397 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Wolde-Meskel, 166 ...