United States District Court, D. Vermont
OPINION AND ORDER (DOCS. 8, 10)
JOHN
M. CONROY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff
Elsa Bruno brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
405(g) of the Social Security Act, requesting review and
remand of the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
denying her application for Disability Insurance Benefits
(DIB). Pending before the Court are Bruno’s motion to
reverse the Commissioner’s decision (Doc. 8), and the
Commissioner’s motion to affirm the same (Doc. 10). For
the reasons stated below, Bruno’s motion is DENIED and
the Commissioner’s motion is GRANTED.
Background
Bruno
was 55 years old on her amended alleged disability onset date
of October 23, 2012. She completed school through the 10th
grade and does not have a GED. She has past work experience
as a cashier, a housekeeper, and a mail clerk. She lives in
West Rutland with her second husband of approximately 15
years and has an adult son who lives in Connecticut. (AR
517.)
Bruno
was born in Puerto Rico, and had an abusive and impoverished
childhood. (AR 489, 517.) She was the second of her
mother’s nine children, each having a different father.
(Id.) The family lived in the projects, relying on
welfare. (AR 517.) Bruno has never met her father, and her
stepfather abused her and her mother. (Id.; AR 489,
505-06.) She married and left home when she was about 16
years old. (AR 489, 517.)
Bruno
suffers from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) and
carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS). She uses an inhaler and a
nebulizer to control her COPD, but still wheezes and has
trouble breathing when walking even short distances. (AR
136-38.) Against the advice of medical providers, and despite
having COPD, Bruno continues to smoke cigarettes. (See,
e.g., AR 544.) Due to her CTS, Bruno has pain when
grabbing things; her hands feel numb when she wakes in the
morning; and she has pain in her wrists. (AR 133-35.) She
also suffers from bipolar disorder. She is
“continuously angry” and has difficulty getting
along with people (AR 489), and she “feel[s] like
everybody is talking about [her]” (AR 140). On a
typical day, Bruno does not do much of anything: she
“barely leave[s] the house” (AR 134) because she
does not want to be around people (133-34); she goes out only
to shop for “two or three things at a time” (AR
136) and to attend medical appointments (AR 134).
Bruno
has a history of opiate drug abuse. She was admitted to
Brattleboro Retreat for a six-day period of detoxification in
May 2012 (AR 493-96), but relapsed soon after her discharge
(AR 508). She has been convicted of multiple criminal
charges, including parole/probation violations, drug charges,
and prostitution; and she has had periods of incarceration,
her most recent lasting one month. (AR 504, 518.)
In July
2012, Bruno filed an application for DIB alleging that,
starting on July 31, 2009[1], she has been unable to work due to
bipolar disorder, depression, and varicose veins. (AR 163,
269.) Her application was denied initially and upon
reconsideration, and she timely requested an administrative
hearing. The hearing was conducted on April 21, 2014 by
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Thomas Merrill. (AR 129-48.)
Bruno appeared and testified, and was represented by an
attorney. A vocational expert (VE) also testified at the
hearing. On May 6, 2014, the ALJ issued a decision finding
that Bruno was not disabled under the Social Security Act
from her amended alleged disability onset date through the
date of the decision. (AR 101-09.) Thereafter, the Appeals
Council denied Bruno’s request for review, rendering
the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the
Commissioner. (AR 1-5.) Having exhausted her administrative
remedies, Bruno filed the Complaint in this action on July
15, 2015. (Doc. 1.)
ALJ
Decision
The
Commissioner uses a five-step sequential process to evaluate
disability claims. See Butts v. Barnhart, 388 F.3d
377, 380-81 (2d Cir. 2004). The first step requires the ALJ
to determine whether the claimant is presently engaging in
“substantial gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If the claimant is not
so engaged, step two requires the ALJ to determine whether
the claimant has a “severe impairment.” 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If the ALJ finds that
the claimant has a severe impairment, the third step requires
the ALJ to make a determination as to whether that impairment
“meets or equals” an impairment listed in 20
C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (“the
Listings”). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d),
416.920(d). The claimant is presumptively disabled if his or
her impairment meets or equals a listed impairment.
Ferraris v. Heckler, 728 F.2d 582, 584 (2d Cir.
1984).
If the
claimant is not presumptively disabled, the ALJ is required
to determine the claimant’s residual functional
capacity (RFC), which means the most the claimant can still
do despite his or her mental and physical limitations based
on all the relevant medical and other evidence in the record.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 404.1545(a)(1),
416.920(e), 416.945(a)(1). The fourth step requires the ALJ
to consider whether the claimant’s RFC precludes the
performance of his or her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). Finally, at the fifth
step, the ALJ determines whether the claimant can do
“any other work.” 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(g), 416.920(g). The claimant bears the burden of
proving his or her case at steps one through four,
Butts, 388 F.3d at 383; and at step five, there is a
“limited burden shift to the Commissioner” to
“show that there is work in the national economy that
the claimant can do, ” Poupore v. Astrue, 566
F.3d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 2009) (clarifying that the burden
shift to the Commissioner at step five is limited, and the
Commissioner “need not provide additional evidence of
the claimant’s [RFC]”).
Employing
this sequential analysis, ALJ Merrill first determined that
Bruno had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since
her amended alleged disability onset date of October 23,
2012. (AR 103.) At step two, the ALJ found that Bruno had the
severe impairments of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease
(COPD) and carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS). (Id.)
Conversely, the ALJ found that Bruno’s bipolar disorder
and varicose veins were not severe. (Id.) Regarding
the bipolar disorder, the ALJ explained: “While
[Bruno’s] symptoms seem to cause functional
limitations, this is attributable to [her] non-compliance
with medication to try to obtain disability benefits.”
(AR 104 (citing AR 539).) Moreover, the ALJ found that
Bruno’s bipolar disorder “causes only mild
limitations in functioning.” (AR 104.) At step three,
the ALJ found that none of Bruno’s impairments, alone
or in combination, met or medically equaled a listed
impairment. (AR 106.) Next, the ALJ determined that Bruno had
the RFC to perform “medium work, ” as defined in
20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(c), except “she can only
frequently handle objects.” (Id.) Given this
RFC, and relying on testimony from the VE, the ALJ found that
Bruno was capable of performing her past relevant work as a
cashier, a housekeeper, and a mail clerk. (AR 109.) The ALJ
concluded that Bruno had not been under a disability from her
amended alleged disability onset date of October 23, 2012
through the date of the decision. (Id.)
Standard
of Review
The
Social Security Act defines the term “disability”
as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(1)(A). A person will be found disabled only if it is
determined that his “impairments are of such severity
that he is not only unable to do his previous work[, ] but
cannot, considering his age, ...