United States District Court, D. Vermont
OPINION AND ORDER (DOCS. 13, 14)
John
M. Conroy, United States Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff
Donna Lyons brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
405(g) of the Social Security Act, requesting review and
remand of the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
denying her application for Disability Insurance Benefits
(DIB). Pending before the Court are Lyons's motion to
reverse the Commissioner's decision (Doc. 13), and the
Commissioner's motion to affirm the same (Doc. 14). For
the reasons stated below, Lyons's motion is GRANTED, the
Commissioner's motion is DENIED, and the matter is
REMANDED for further proceedings and a new decision.
Background
Lyons
was 50 years old on her alleged disability onset date of
October 1, 2011. She has a high school education and work
experience as an owner/operator of a boiler mechanic company
and a caregiver for her father-in-law. In 2011-2012, she
worked for approximately six months on a part-time basis as a
cashier at a local grocery store, and for approximately two
weeks as an assistant manager at a retail store. She stopped
working in May 2012. Lyons is married and lives with her
husband, who has been disabled since the late 1990s. (AR 34,
36.)
Lyons
suffers from foot, knee, back, and hip pain, resulting in an
inability to sit or stand for extended periods. She was
diagnosed with fibromyalgia in the fall of 2014, and was
found to have 18 of 18 trigger points. (See AR 509,
528, 530, 532.) She also suffers from anxiety, panic attacks,
agoraphobia, depression, and sleep problems. Lyons testified
that, due to her anxiety and agoraphobia, she rarely leaves
her home. (AR 46.) When she goes to medical appointments, she
has her husband drive and accompany her. (AR 46-47.) Lyons
further testified that she is “very dependent” on
her husband (AR 47) and “get[s] sick” if she has
to go anywhere without him (AR 51). She takes the following
medications for her various physical and mental ailments:
morphine, Diazepam, Lidocaine patches, Lidocaine creams,
Xanax, Zoloft, and Gebapentin. (AR 52.) Despite her
limitations, Lyons was able to do some housework (in
15-minute increments), cook limited meals, and shop in
stores, for at least part of the alleged disability period.
(See, e.g., AR 242, 244, 245.) She was also able to
help care for her disabled husband and their dog at times
during that period. (AR 244, 480.)
In May
2013, Lyons filed her DIB application, alleging that she has
been unable to work full time since October 2011 due to pain
in her hip, knees, and feet; a small central disc protrusion;
agoraphobia; panic attacks; anxiety; and depression. (AR
231.) Her application was denied initially and upon
reconsideration, and she timely requested an administrative
hearing. On March 3, 2015, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
Matthew Levin conducted a hearing on the application (AR
31-65); and on April 3, 2015, the ALJ issued a decision
finding that Lyons was not disabled under the Social Security
Act from her alleged disability onset date through the date
of the decision (AR 13-25). Thereafter, Lyons submitted a
request for review to the Appeals Council, wherein she asked
the Council to consider new medical evidence including
opinions and treatment notes from three of her treating
physicians. The Council declined to consider this new
evidence and denied Lyons's request for review, rendering
the ALJ's decision the final decision of the
Commissioner. (AR 1-6.) Having exhausted her administrative
remedies, Lyons filed the Complaint in this action on October
26, 2015. (Doc. 3.)
ALJ
Decision
The
Commissioner uses a five-step sequential process to evaluate
disability claims. See Butts v. Barnhart, 388 F.3d
377, 380-81 (2d Cir. 2004). The first step requires the ALJ
to determine whether the claimant is presently engaging in
“substantial gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If the claimant is not
so engaged, step two requires the ALJ to determine whether
the claimant has a “severe impairment.” 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If the ALJ finds that
the claimant has a severe impairment, the third step requires
the ALJ to make a determination as to whether that impairment
“meets or equals” an impairment listed in 20
C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (“the
Listings”). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d),
416.920(d). The claimant is presumptively disabled if his or
her impairment meets or equals a listed impairment.
Ferraris v. Heckler, 728 F.2d 582, 584 (2d Cir.
1984).
If the
claimant is not presumptively disabled, the ALJ is required
to determine the claimant's residual functional capacity
(RFC), which means the most the claimant can still do despite
his or her mental and physical limitations based on all the
relevant medical and other evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(e), 404.1545(a)(1), 416.920(e),
416.945(a)(1). The fourth step requires the ALJ to consider
whether the claimant's RFC precludes the performance of
his or her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(f), 416.920(f). Finally, at the fifth step, the ALJ
determines whether the claimant can do “any other
work.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g).
The claimant bears the burden of proving his or her case at
steps one through four, Butts, 388 F.3d at 383; and
at step five, there is a “limited burden shift to the
Commissioner” to “show that there is work in the
national economy that the claimant can do, ”
Poupore v. Astrue, 566 F.3d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 2009)
(clarifying that the burden shift to the Commissioner at step
five is limited, and the Commissioner “need not provide
additional evidence of the claimant's [RFC]”).
Employing
this sequential analysis, ALJ Levin first determined that,
although Lyons had worked on a part-time basis as a cashier
at a convenience store and an assistant manager at a retail
store during the alleged disability period, she had not
engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged
disability onset date of October 1, 2011. (AR 15.) At step
two, the ALJ found that Lyons had the severe impairments of
fibromyalgia, left patellofemoral pain (knee pain), and
anxiety. (AR 16.) Conversely, the ALJ found that Lyons's
degenerative disc disease was nonsevere. (Id.) At
step three, the ALJ determined that none of Lyons's
impairments, alone or in combination, met or medically
equaled a listed impairment. (AR 16-18.)
Next,
the ALJ determined that Lyons had the RFC to perform
“sedentary work, ” as defined in 20 C.F.R. §
404.1567(b), except as follows:
[Lyons] can occasionally climb stairs, ladders, ropes[, ] and
scaffolds[;] can frequently stoop and occasionally perform
all other postural maneuvers consisting of kneeling,
crouching, crawling[, ] and balancing[;] can interact
appropriately with the general public[;] and can sustain
routine social interaction with co[]workers and supervisors.
(AR 19.) Given this RFC, the ALJ found that Lyons was unable
to perform her past relevant work as a care provider and an
office manager. (AR 23.) Yet the ALJ found that Lyons had
acquired transferable work skills from her work as an office
manager in the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning
(HVAC) contracting business, including “scheduling,
payroll[, ] and handling calls.” (AR 24.) The ALJ thus
determined that there were other jobs existing in significant
numbers in the national economy that Lyons could perform,
including the jobs of greeter, dispatcher, and switchboard
operator. (Id.) The ALJ concluded that Lyons had not
been under a disability from the alleged onset date of
October 1, 2011 through April 3, 2015, the date of the
decision. (AR 25.)
Standard
of Review
The
Social Security Act defines the term “disability”
as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(1)(A). A person will be found disabled only if it is
determined that his “impairments are of such severity
that he is not only unable to do his previous work[, ] but
cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience,
engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which
exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(2)(A).
In
considering a Commissioner's disability decision, the
court “review[s] the administrative record de
novo to determine whether there is substantial evidence
supporting the . . . decision and whether the Commissioner
applied the correct legal standard.” Machadio v.
Apfel, 276 F.3d 103, 108 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Shaw
v. Chater, 221 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 2000));
see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The court's factual
review of the Commissioner's decision is thus limited to
determining whether “substantial evidence” exists
in the record to support such decision. 42 U.S.C. §
405(g); Rivera v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 964, 967 (2d
Cir. 1991); see Alston v. Sullivan, 904 F.2d 122,
126 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Where there is substantial
evidence to support either position, the determination is one
to be made by the factfinder.”). “Substantial
evidence” is more than a mere scintilla; it means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v.
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