United States District Court, D. Vermont
OPINION AND ORDER (Docs. 10, 11)
John
M. Conroy United States Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff
Kenya Villines brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g) of the Social Security Act, requesting review
and remand of the decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security denying her application for Supplemental Security
Income (SSI). Pending before the Court are Villines's
motion to reverse the Commissioner's decision (Doc. 10),
and the Commissioner's motion to affirm the same (Doc.
11). For the reasons stated below, Villines's motion is
DENIED, and the Commissioner's motion is GRANTED.
Background
Villines
was 40 years old on her amended alleged disability onset date
of February 1, 2013. She dropped out of school in the tenth
grade when she was pregnant with her eldest child. (AR 375,
539.) In August 2012, she was taking GED classes twice a week
and was enrolled in a drug relapse prevention class, a
parenting class, and a computer class. (AR 527.) Villines
worked as a security guard for about four years until around
2006. (AR 49, 186, 375, 539.) Before that, she worked as a
cashier at various fast food restaurants and at a drug store.
(AR 49, 186, 539.) She also worked “under the table
doing remode[]ling” until May 2010 (AR 375) and for
one-to-two weeks in December 2013, again “under the
table, ” “helping [a] lady clean” rooms (AR
48). In September 2013, Villines was spending “varying
amounts of time looking for a job, ” including a
cleaning services job. (AR 564; see also AR 565
(“currently looking for work”).) She was unable
to return to security work because her ex-boyfriend had
obtained a restraining order against her, which she stated
would be “on her record” for at least two years.
(AR 564.)
The
record reveals that Villines was physically and emotionally
abused, and sexually molested by her stepfather, as a child.
(AR 566; see also AR 546.) The record further
indicates that she was “brutally raped and
assaulted” at a young age (AR 537 (raped at age 12);
see also AR 546 (raped at age 21)), and physically
abused by a boyfriend as an adult (AR 377). At the age of 16,
she left her mother's home and was placed in a girl's
group home. (AR 527.)
Villines
has a history of drug abuse, and was addicted to cocaine and
marijuana for more than 12 years from her early 20s until her
early 30s. (AR 538.) In August 2006, she was arrested for
selling drugs to an undercover detective; after a week in
jail, she was sent to a medical center for outpatient drug
and alcohol treatment. (AR 526-27.) In June 2009, she
completed two years of mandatory drug and alcohol treatment
(AR 526); and in October 2011, she reported having been
“sober and drug[-]free for over three years” (AR
376; see also AR 527 (“clean for [four] years
and [eight] months”)). As of March 2013, she reported
having been “clean and sober” for seven years.
(AR 540.) The record indicates, however, that she
“‘fell off the wagon' and resumed using
cocaine” during the summer and fall of 2013 (AR 754),
quitting again on November 12, 2013 (AR 757).
Villines
has never been married but lived with the father of her
younger son for eight years. (AR 565.) She lived with another
man for four years, until he passed away in 2007.
(Id.; AR 527.) She has two sons but did not raise
them because of her problems with substance abuse. (AR 377,
526, 538.) In 2001, she lost custody of one of her sons due
to her drug and alcohol abuse. (AR 526.) In October 2011, one
of her sons was 16 years old and living with her and her
boyfriend, and the other was 22 years old and incarcerated
for life. (AR 375, 377, 565.) In February 2012, her younger
son was “placed outside the home due to [the Department
of Health Services] being involved, ” coming home to
visit Villines on the weekends. (AR 527.) In the summer of
2013, Villines and her boyfriend separated, and she and her
son were forced to leave the apartment where the three had
been living. (AR 563, 567.)
Due at
least in part to her troubled childhood, Villines suffers
from several mental health impairments. She has anger issues
and is uncomfortable around crowds or strangers. (AR 537,
564.) She has nightmares and poor sleep; she cries easily;
she feels sad and hopeless “much of the time”;
and her mood is “chronically depressed.” (AR 537;
see also AR 526.) She has a long history of
depression and anxiety, and has attended therapy sessions
since September 2011. (AR 526, 529, 567 (struggles with
“intermittent bouts of depression, typically
situationally related, according to her accounts”).)
Villines also suffers from several physical impairments,
including rheumatoid arthritis; hypertension; obesity; and
pain in her shoulders, back, hips, and knees.
On a
typical day in September 2013 (approximately eight months
into the alleged disability period), Villines: attended
appointments and ran errands, attended Narcotics Anonymous
meetings at least once weekly, regularly attended therapy
sessions, occasionally went to the library to search online
for a job, worked on her resume, socialized with friends
including sometimes going out to eat, watched movies,
meditated, and cooked meals for herself and her friend. (AR
564-65.) At the September 2014 administrative hearing,
Villines testified that she was able to do some chores,
including cooking light meals, washing dishes, occasionally
dusting furniture, and starting the laundry. (AR 51-52.) She
stated that her son or other family members completed the
remaining chores, which she was physically unable to do. (AR
53.) She further stated that she no longer went to the movies
but she watched television and read newspapers and magazines.
(AR 59-60.)
In
December 2012, Villines applied for SSI, alleging that,
starting on June 1, 2010, she had been unable to work due to
rheumatoid arthritis, depression, paranoia, posttraumatic
stress disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder,
and high blood pressure. (AR 169-78, 195.) Her application
was denied initially and upon reconsideration, and she timely
requested an administrative hearing. The hearing was
conducted on September 15, 2014 by Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) Alan Sacks. (AR 40-72.) Villines appeared and
testified, and was represented by an attorney. A vocational
expert (VE) also testified at the hearing.
Villines
testified at the hearing that she can stand, walk, and sit
for only 30 minutes at a time, respectively, before needing
to switch positions. (AR 55.) She further testified that she
has difficulty bending and crouching (id.), and has
“[c]onstant pain” “all over, ”
including in her hips, back, neck, and knees. (AR 56.) She
also testified that she has trouble sleeping (AR 58), and
does not usually travel alone because she feels
“anxious and uneasy” around crowds (AR 60).
Nonetheless, Villines stated that she gets along with people
outside of crowds (id.) and that her mood is only
“a little slightly depressive” (AR 61).
Significantly, Villines testified that she would have been
able to perform a sedentary job (with some particular
limitations) without missing more than two days of work per
month up until February 2013. (See AR 50 (Villines
testifying that if she had been offered a fulltime
housekeeping job “early in 2013, ” she
“probably would have” taken it); see
also AR 62-64.) Given this testimony, on September 19,
2014, Villines amended her alleged disability onset date to
February 1, 2013. (AR 185.)
On
October 28, 2014, the ALJ issued a decision finding that
Villines was not disabled under the Social Security Act at
any time from her alleged disability onset date through the
date of the decision. (AR 23-35.) Thereafter, the Appeals
Council denied Villines's request for review, rendering
the ALJ's decision the final decision of the
Commissioner. (AR 5-11.) Having exhausted her administrative
remedies, Villines filed the Complaint in this action on
August 30, 2016. (Doc. 3.)
ALJ
Decision
The
Commissioner uses a five-step sequential process to evaluate
disability claims. See Butts v. Barnhart, 388 F.3d
377, 380-81 (2d Cir. 2004). The first step requires the ALJ
to determine whether the claimant is presently engaging in
“substantial gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If the claimant is not
so engaged, step two requires the ALJ to determine whether
the claimant has a “severe impairment.” 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If the ALJ finds that
the claimant has a severe impairment, the third step requires
the ALJ to make a determination as to whether that impairment
“meets or equals” an impairment listed in 20
C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (“the
Listings”). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d),
416.920(d). The claimant is presumptively disabled if his or
her impairment meets or equals a listed impairment.
Ferraris v. Heckler, 728 F.2d 582, 584 (2d Cir.
1984).
If the
claimant is not presumptively disabled, the ALJ is required
to determine the claimant's residual functional capacity
(RFC), which means the most the claimant can still do despite
his or her mental and physical limitations based on all the
relevant medical and other evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(e), 404.1545(a)(1), 416.920(e),
416.945(a)(1). The fourth step requires the ALJ to consider
whether the claimant's RFC precludes the performance of
his or her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(f), 416.920(f). Finally, at the fifth step, the ALJ
determines whether the claimant can do “any other
work.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g).
The claimant bears the burden of proving his or her case at
steps one through four, Butts, 388 F.3d at 383; and
at step five, there is a “limited burden shift to the
Commissioner” to “show that there is work in the
national economy that the claimant can do, ”
Poupore v. Astrue, 566 F.3d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 2009)
(clarifying that the burden shift to the Commissioner at step
five is limited, and the Commissioner “need not provide
additional evidence of the claimant's [RFC]”).
Employing
this sequential analysis, ALJ Sacks first determined that
Villines had not engaged in substantial gainful activity
since her alleged disability onset date of February 1, 2013.
(AR 24.) At step two, the ALJ found that Villines had the
following severe impairments: arthritis, degeneration of the
cervical spine, obesity, and depression. (AR 25-26, 34.)
Conversely, the ALJ found that Villines's heart
impairment, hypertension, kidney injury, ankle injury, and
joint pain were non-severe. (AR 25-26.) At step three, the
ALJ found that none of Villines's impairments, alone or
in combination, met or medically equaled a listed impairment.
(AR 26-30, 34.) Next, the ALJ determined that Villines had
the RFC to perform “light work, ” as defined in
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b), 416.967(b), so long as it
“involv[ed] only simple, routine tasks[;] low stress[;]
and low contacts with others.” (AR 32, 34.) Given this
RFC, the ALJ found that Villines was unable to perform her
past relevant work as a cashier or a security guard. (AR 33.)
Finally, based on testimony from the VE, the ALJ determined
that Villines could perform other jobs existing in
significant numbers in the national economy, including the
jobs of housekeeper and bakery worker. (AR 33-34, 35.) The
ALJ concluded that Villines had not been disabled since the
amended alleged disability onset date. (AR 35.)
Standard
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