United States District Court, D. Vermont
OPINION AND ORDER (DOCS. 15, 18)
GEOFFREY W. CRAWFORD, JUDGE.
Plaintiff
Joseph Wortman brings this action under 42 U.S.C. §
405(g), requesting reversal of the decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security denying his applications for
supplemental security income ("SSI") and disability
insurance benefits ("DIB"). Pending before the
court is Mr. Wortman's motion to reverse the
Commissioner's decision (Doc. 15) and the
Commissioner's motion to affirm (Doc. 18). For the
reasons stated below, the court DENIES Mr. Wortman's
motion to reverse and GRANTS the Commissioner's motion to
affirm.
Background
Mr.
Wortman, born in 1985, applied for SSI benefits on May 28,
2013, and for DIB benefits on June 7, 2013, alleging a
disability onset date of June 20, 2012. (AR 11, 188, 190.)
The claims were denied initially on August 8, 2013, and on
reconsideration on October 11, 2013. (AR 11, 120, 128.) Mr.
Wortman had a hearing before Administrative Law Judge
("ALJ") Paul Martin on December 2, 2014. (AR31.)
At the
hearing, Mr. Wortman testified that he had a high school
diploma, but that he had learning disabilities and was placed
in special education programs throughout his schooling. (AR
38.) He also had taken a few community college classes, where
he received other accommodations based on his learning
disabilities. (AR 38-39.)
According
to Mr. Wortman, his learning comprehension challenges are his
biggest issue. (AR 46.) He testified that as a child he was
diagnosed with Sotos Syndrome.[2] (AR 57.) He has trouble comprehending
what he reads, and he cannot read more than a few pages
without becoming bored and losing focus. (AR A6-A1.)
He said that, in his previous position as an inventory
manager, he could keep track of information between one
quarter and one half of the time. (AR47.)
Mr.
Wortman also testified that he "get[s] an electrical
charge through [] my neck and into my brain and it messes me
up a little." (AR 40.) He said that one of his doctors
wishes to start him on a new medication for this issue. (AR
53.) He also complained that he has had trouble with his
equilibrium. (AR 53.)
Mr.
Wortman testified that he suffers from depression and
anxiety. He said that he typically simply stays at home and
does not like to go anywhere. (AR 54.) He related an incident
in the past week, in which, simply sitting in his apartment,
he "felt like I couldn't breathe." (AR 55.) He
said he has a friend who lives down the hall that he sees
occasionally, but that he does not go out in public. (AR 54.)
Large groups of people cause Mr. Wortman to become anxious,
and he avoids going shopping at the supermarket during the
day for this reason. (AR 72.) He says that he can get along
with a small group of people. (AR 75.)
Mr.
Wortman also testified to physical impairments. He testified
that he gets back spasms after standing for just a couple of
minutes. (AR 58.) He also has nerve pain in one of his feet
and that a doctor has prescribed an orthopedic shoe as a
corrective, although he has not yet had an appointment to
obtain the shoe. (AR 49-51.)
With
regard to current treatment, Mr. Wortman said that he
currently sees his therapist every few weeks, takes Effexor
for his depression and anxiety, and takes Mobic for back
pain. (AR 55-56, 67.)
Mr.
Wortman testified that he is recently divorced, and that,
while he lives by himself, his girlfriend provides daily
assistance to him. (AR 39-40.) She typically does the
driving, although Mr. Wortman drives occasionally. (AR 40.)
Mr. Wortman's girlfriend also helps him with cooking and
other chores. (AR 74.)
Mr.
Wortman also testified about his prior work history. (AR
41-45, 65-66.) He has worked as a security guard, a
landscaper, a warehouse worker, a stock clerk, and an
inventory clerk, among other positions. He was also briefly
in the military, but he stated that he did not make it
through basic training, and was discharged. (AR 48.)
Vocational
expert ("VE"), James Parker, also testified at the
hearing. (AR 76-82.) The ALJ questioned the VE about whether
Mr. Wortman had worked in his prior jobs long enough to
become competent in them, and whether they required
interaction with large groups or extensive reading. (AR
78-80.)
ALJ
Decision
The ALJ
is required to follow the five-step process in determining a
claimant's disability. Machia v. Astrue, 670
F.Supp.2d 326, 333 (D. Vt. 2009) (internal citation omitted);
see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. The
answer at each step determines if the next step must be
addressed. Machia, 670 F.Supp.2d at 330. At the
first step the ALJ determines if the claimant has engaged in
substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date of
his disability. Id. If the answer is no, step two
then asks if the claimant has any "impairments"
that are "severe." Id.
If
there is one or more severe impairment, step three evaluates
whether any of these impairments meet the listed impairments
in Appendix 1 of the regulations; if an impairment meets the
listing the claimant is deemed disabled. If it does not, step
four asks whether the claimant retains the residual
functional capacity ("RFC") to do his past relevant
work. Id. If the claimant can no longer do his past
relevant work, step five asks whether the claimant is able to
do any job available in significant numbers in the national
economy. Id. "The claimant bears the burden of
proving his case at steps one through four, . . . and at step
five, there is a 'limited burden shift to the
Commissioner' to 'show that there is work in the
national economy that the claimant can do.'"
Larkin v. Comm'r o/Soc. Sec, No. 2T0-CV-291,
2011 WL 4499296, at *2 (D. Vt. Sept. 27, 2011) (quoting
Poupore v. Astrue, 566 F.3d 303, 306 (2d Cir.
2009)).
At step
one, the ALJ determined that Mr. Wortman had not engaged in
any substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset
date, June 20, 2012. (AR 13.) At step two, he found that Mr.
Wortman had the following severe impairments: Sotos syndrome
with an anxiety disorder; a depressive disorder; a cognitive
disorder; a learning disorder; and attention deficit
disorder. (AR 13.) The ALJ concluded that none of Mr.
Wortman's alleged physical impairments were severe. (AR
14.) At step three, the ALJ found that none of Mr.
Wortman's impairments met or medically equaled a listed
impairment. (AR 15.)
Ahead
of step four, the ALJ determined that Mr. Wortman had an RFC
to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels, but
with some non-exertional limitations. (AR 17.) Mr. Wortman
was "limited to interacting with groups of no larger
than 8 to 10 people and capable of engaging in only brief,
superficial interaction with the general public."
(Id.) He was also able "to read short, simple
written instructions and otherwise be able to understand,
remember, and carry out tasks involving four to five step
instructions." (Id.) The ALJ noted that he was
"able to maintain concentration, persistence, and pace
for two-hour intervals throughout the course of an 8-hour
workday and 40-hour workweek, " and was able to
"adapt to routine workplace changes."
(Id.)
At step
four, the ALJ found that, with this RFC, Mr. Wortman could
perform some of his past relevant work, including his
positions as a security guard, warehouse worker, stock clerk,
and landscape laborer. (AR 21.) The ALJ therefore concluded
that Mr. Wortman was not disabled and did not reach step
five. (AR 22.)
The
Appeals Council denied review on June 29, 2016. (AR 1.) This
case was filed on August 8, 2016. (Doc. 1.)
Standard
of Review
Disability
is defined by the Social Security Act in pertinent part as
the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(1)(A). Under the Act, a claimant will only be found
disabled if it is determined that his "impairments are
of such severity that he is not only unable to do his
previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and
work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial
gainful work which exists in the national economy."
Id. § 423(d)(2)(A).
When
considering the ALJ's disability decision, the court
"review[s] the administrative record de novo to
determine whether there is substantial evidence supporting
the . . . decision and whether the Commissioner applied the
correct legal standard." Machadio v. Apfel, 276
F.3d 103, 108 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Shaw v. Chater,
221 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 2000)); see 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g). The decision is subject to a factual review
determining whether "substantial evidence" exists
in the record to support such decision. 42 U.S.C. §
405(g); Rivera v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 964, 967 (2d
Cir. 1991); see Alston v. Sullivan, 904 F.2d 122,
126 (2d Cir. 1990) ("Where there is substantial evidence
to support either position, the determination is one to be
made by the fact[-]fmder."). "Substantial
evidence" is more than a mere scintilla; it means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Poupore, 566
F.3d at 305. The court is mindful that the Social Security
Act is "a remedial statute to be broadly construed and
liberally applied." Dousewicz v. Harris, 646
F.2d 771, 773 (2d Cir. 1981); see also, e.g., Johnson v.
Comm'r of Soc. Sec, No. 2:13-cv-217, 2014 WL
2118444, at *3 (D. Vt. May 21, 2014).
Analysis
Mr.
Wortman makes three arguments on appeal. First, he argues
that the ALJ did not provide "good reasons" for
discounting the opinions of treating sources and for
according substantial weight to the opinions of other
sources. (Doc. 15-1 at 8-11.) Second, he contends that the
ALJ did not rely on a medical opinion to craft Mr.
Wortman's RFC and instead improperly used his own lay
knowledge. (Id. at 6-8.) Third, he asserts that the
ALJ erred by failing to ask the vocational expert whether a
hypothetical worker with all the limitations described in the
RFC could perform his past work. (Id. at 12.)
I.
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