On
Appeal from Superior Court, Franklin Unit, Criminal Division
A.
Gregory Rainville, J. David Tartter, Deputy State's
Attorney, Montpelier, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Matthew F. Valerio, Defender General, and Rebecca Turner and
Amanda Isaacs, Appellate Defenders, Montpelier, for
Defendant-Appellant.
PRESENT: Reiber, C.J., Skoglund, Robinson, Eaton and Carroll,
JJ.
EATON,
J.
¶
1. On May 3, 2016, Ty Baker, Sr. pleaded no contest to
grossly negligent operation in violation of 23 V.S.A. §
1091(b) after his car collided with and totaled another car.
Husband and wife owned the car and wife was driving the car
when the accident occurred. Following his conviction and a
contested restitution hearing, Baker was ordered to pay
$828.88, which were lost wages for husband, who was not in
the car at the time of the collision. Baker appeals the
restitution order, arguing that husband does not qualify as a
"victim" under the restitution statute, that the
lost wages were not a "direct result" of
defendant's crime, and that the State's evidence was
insufficient to prove the amount of restitution. 13 V.S.A.
§ 5301(4); 13 V.S.A. § 7043. We hold that even if
husband was a victim under the restitution statute, his lost
wages were not a direct result of defendant's criminal
act and therefore fall outside the scope of Vermont's
restitution statute, 13 V.S.A. § 7043. Accordingly, we
reverse and vacate the restitution order.
¶
2. The facts are as follows. On September 4, 2015, Baker was
driving his vehicle in Swanton when he crossed the center
line and collided with an oncoming car driven by wife. Wife
and her children, who live in Massachusetts, were driving to
Vermont for vacation. Husband had stayed home to work, but
upon hearing of the accident, he left work about half-way
into his shift to come to Vermont. Husband was working
weekend shifts that lasted twelve hours-4:30 p.m. to 4:30
a.m.-so before driving to Vermont on September 4 to pick up
his family, he slept for a few hours. He arrived in Vermont
on September 5 and attended to various issues associated with
the accident, including matters concerning the police,
insurance, and retrieving personal items from the damaged
car. The family returned to Massachusetts together on
September 6. In total, husband missed 29.25 hours of work,
resulting in lost wages of $828.88. Insurance did not cover
his lost wages.
¶
3. The court held a restitution hearing on September 7, 2016.
The court first found that husband qualified as a
"victim" under the restitution statute, reasoning
that he was a joint owner of the totaled car and therefore
suffered financial injury as a direct result of the crime.
The court then considered whether husband's lost wages
were compensable under the restitution statute. The court
reasoned that, although the family initially came to Vermont
for vacation, Baker's crime "changed the nature of
their visit entirely"; the time that husband took away
from work was to deal with matters directly caused by
Baker's crime. Thus, it concluded, husband's lost
wages were a direct result of Baker's crime and therefore
compensable under the restitution statute. Finally, the court
determined the amount of restitution. It noted that there was
no evidence at the time of husband's decision to drive to
Vermont that Baker's insurance would cover a rental car
or would even accept liability, and the court ordered
restitution for the full amount claimed of $828.88. The court
refused to consider any testimony or argument that husband
could have lessened the time he missed from work. This appeal
followed.
¶
4. On appeal, Baker challenges the restitution order on three
bases. First, he argues that husband is not a
"victim" under the restitution statute. Second, he
argues that husband's lost wages were not the
"direct result" of his crime. Finally, he argues
that the State's evidence is insufficient to prove the
amount of restitution, and specifically, he contests the
court's finding that husband's three days of lost
work was reasonable based on sufficient, credible evidence.
¶
5. Baker's first argument, that husband is not a
"victim" for purposes of restitution, requires us
to interpret the restitution statute, 13 V.S.A. § 7043,
and its incorporated definition of "victim." 13
V.S.A. § 5301(4). Our review is therefore de novo.
State v. Gorton, 2014 VT 1, ¶ 8, 195 Vt. 460,
90 A.3d 901. In the absence of ambiguity, "we enforce
the statute according to its terms." Payne v. U.S.
Airways, Inc., 2009 VT 90, ¶ 24, 186 Vt. 458, 987
A.2d 944.
¶
6. Here, the statutory language is explicit with respect to
who qualifies as a victim: "victim" is defined as
"a person who sustains physical, emotional or financial
injury or death as a direct result of the commission or
attempted commission of a crime or act of delinquency."
13 V.S.A. § 5301(4); see also id. §
7043(a) (incorporating the definition of "victim"
in § 5301(4)). The statute narrows the category of
victims eligible to receive restitution to those who have
"suffered a material loss." 13 V.S.A. §
7043(a)(1). "Material loss, " in turn, is
"uninsured property loss, uninsured out-of-pocket
monetary loss, uninsured lost wages, and uninsured medical
expenses." Id. § 7043(a)(2). Thus,
"victim" and "material loss" are distinct
concepts. While an individual may qualify as a victim for
purposes of restitution, a victim will be eligible for
restitution only if, and to the extent that, he or she has
suffered a "material loss."
¶
7. Here, husband qualifies as a victim under the restitution
statute because he sustained financial injury through his
ownership interest in the damaged car.[1] This conclusion
is in line with our previous decisions. For example, in
State v. Morse, the defendant crashed his truck into
a car owned by the car driver's mother. 2014 VT 84,
¶ 22, 197 Vt. 495, 106 A.3d 902. While not stating it
explicitly, we defined the mother as a victim for purposes of
restitution and affirmed the trial court's order of
restitution for damage to the car. Id. Here, wife
testified at the restitution hearing that she believed she
and husband were joint owners of the vehicle involved in the
accident and that both of their names were listed on the
vehicle's insurance, and the court found those statements
to be credible. Just as in Morse, the accident for
which Baker was convicted damaged husband and wife's
vehicle, meaning that husband suffered financial loss as a
direct result of the crime. See also State v.
Jarvis, 146 Vt. 636, 638, 509 A.2d 1005, 1006 (1986)
(noting that recoverable losses "include, but are not
necessarily limited to, hospital bills, property
value, and lost employment income" (emphasis
added)). Our conclusion that husband qualifies as a victim
due to his financial loss in the vehicle does not mean that
the lost wages he claims are recoverable in restitution. We
must still consider whether his lost wages qualify as a
"material loss" that can be recovered via
restitution because his wage loss was directly related to the
criminal act. [2]
¶
8. Baker argues that husband's lost wages were not
properly recoverable via restitution because they were not
directly linked to his crime as required by the restitution
statute's definition of "victim" as a person
who has suffered injury "as a direct result of
the commission . . . of a crime." 13 V.S.A. §
5301(4) (emphasis added). The State, on the other hand,
argues that husband's decision to drive to Vermont was
reasonable, stemming from circumstances that were the
"natural and probable consequence[s]" of
Baker's crime. This appeal, thus, hinges on what
constitutes a "direct result, " and specifically,
on what form of causation the statute requires.
¶
9. The State's argument is that reasonable actions taken
in response to the natural and probable consequences of a
crime are recoverable via restitution. This argument
essentially asks us to use a but-for standard of causation.
By asking us to accept that restitution is appropriate
because "[t]hey needed to deal with the aftermath of the
accident, " the State is arguing that results, such as
husband's lost wages that would not have occurred but for
a crime, and reasonable efforts to deal with those results
fall within the purview of the restitution statute. We have,
however, already interpreted the phrase "direct
result" in the restitution context to require something
more than but-for causation. See State v. LaFlam,
2008 VT 108, ¶¶ 8, 11, 184 Vt. 629, 965 A.2d 519
(mem.) (declining to find direct link and rejecting but-for
causation as "the sole standard for causation for
restitution in Vermont"). "But-for" causation
is satisfied if an injury "would not have occurred
'but for' the defendant's conduct."
Collins v. Thomas, 2007 VT 92, ¶ 8, 182 Vt.
250, 938 A.2d 1208; see also Cause, Black's Law
Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining "but-for"
causation as "[t]he cause without which the event could
not have occurred"). The scope of restitution, however,
...