United States District Court, D. Vermont
Christopher J. Davis, Plaintiff,
v.
Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER (Docs. 13, 16)
John
M. Conroy United States Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff
Christopher J. Davis brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g) of the Social Security Act, requesting review
and remand of the decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security denying his applications for Disability Insurance
Benefits (DIB) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI).
Pending before the Court are Davis's motion to reverse
the Commissioner's decision (Doc. 13), and the
Commissioner's motion to affirm the same (Doc. 16). For
the reasons stated below, Davis's motion is DENIED, and
the Commissioner's motion is GRANTED.
Factual
Background
Davis
was 29 years old on his alleged disability onset date of June
30, 2003. He graduated from high school and worked in the
following jobs, each for only a short period of time: a
cashier at a convenience store, a short order cook, a
housekeeper/ janitor, and a seasonal worker at a ski resort.
He is married and has two daughters, approximately ages nine
and sixteen, who he helped care for during the relevant
period. He also has an older daughter who he gave up for
adoption when she was a young child.
Davis
had a difficult childhood marked by abuse, limited social
relationships, lack of stability, and behavioral problems.
(AR 305, 862, 1494-95.) When he was a young child, Davis was
physically and sexually abused by his parents. He and his
sister were removed from the family home when Davis was six
years old, and he spent the rest of his childhood in state
custody. Though his sister was adopted, Davis had multiple
placements in foster homes and youth centers, and several
admissions to mental health and addiction hospitals primarily
due to his conduct-related issues. Davis also spent time in
prison for committing petty theft as a child and check
forgery as an adult; and he served a long period of house
arrest, ending in November 2009, due to a charge of occupied
burglary. (See AR 224, 301, 305, 554, 729, 1623,
1625, 1627-33.)
In
2006, Davis married his current wife, Mandy Davis, who has
testified at multiple administrative hearings in support of
Davis's disability application. A November 2006 medical
report states that, on a typical day during the alleged
disability period, Davis helped prepare his daughter for
school, used the computer, cooked, attended to his personal
care, and did chores. (AR 302.) A psychological report from
November 2007 indicates that Davis was “an at-home
father” and “the primary caregiver for his two
children[, ] as his wife [was] work[ing] full time outside of
the home.” (AR 307.) In February 2007, Davis reported
that he spent five to six hours a day in front of a computer
(AR 346); and in April 2007, he reported spending ten to
twelve hours a day engaged in that activity (AR 337). In June
2007, Davis was “working as a cook at a local
restaurant, which [required] him to stand [for] [eight] to
[ten] hours per day.” (AR 334.) By July 2008, however,
Davis stated in a Function Report that he did not leave the
house other than for medical appointments because he was on
house arrest; the heat bothered him; and he found it hard to
breath. (AR 189.) He stated that, on a typical day, he drank
coffee, smoked cigarettes, cleaned the house, helped his wife
with their kids, and “buil[t]/tinker[ed]/play[ed] on
computers.” (AR 186.) He stated that sometimes he did
nothing all day except “escape in my computer
work” (id.), and that he was “agitated
all the time” and did not get along with people (AR
191).
In
December 2009, Davis testified that he was the primary
caretaker of his children and that Mandy worked outside the
home doing graphic design for a newspaper. (AR 1210.) In
December 2011, Mandy testified that Davis watched their
daughters (ages two and nine at the time) only on Sunday and
Monday evenings while Mandy worked (AR 2499); and he watched
television and slept most of the day (AR 2497; see
AR 2672, 2685 (Davis and Mandy testifying in September 2013
that Davis watched television for much of the day)). Mandy
further testified that, although prior to December 2011,
Davis cared for their girls more frequently and did housework
while she was at work, his depression had worsened so that he
did not do much of that anymore. (AR 2500-01.)
In
September 2013, Mandy testified that the family had received
state subsidized childcare from 2008 through April 2013
because she was working and Davis “had mood instability
and could not care for the kids full[]time.” (AR 2678.)
Mandy further testified that Davis had cared for their
younger daughter in 2009, but that lasted only “a
couple weeks” because “he was clearly not able to
and [they therefore] found daycare.” (Id.)
Mandy explained that Davis was “fine” in
emergencies but he did not interact with their children; he
was “hostile” with their older daughter; and he
had “violent thoughts towards” their younger
daughter. (Id.) In August 2016, Mandy testified that
Davis could not care for their children due to his anxiety
and anger outbursts. (AR 2393.) She explained that he has
“a very hard time trying to remain unemotional and
unreactive when it comes to parenting.” (Id.)
Nonetheless, Mandy stated that Davis stayed home with the
children three days a week while she worked, although they
were older and did not require much supervision anymore. (AR
2394.) During a typical day, Mandy stated that Davis did some
household chores like the dishes and laundry, fed their pets,
and tinkered on electronics; on some days, however, she said
he did nothing all day. (AR 2397.) Mandy also noted that
sometimes Davis went to the thrift shop and “talk[ed]
to the old ladies down there” while looking for free
electronics. (AR 2399.)
Overall,
the record reflects that Davis has anti-social tendencies.
(See, e.g., AR 931.) He appears to have close
relationships with only his wife and his sister; and he
leaves the house only occasionally (he does not have a
driver's license). He has had longstanding difficulties
with interpersonal interactions and anger management; and he
suffers from mood disorders, depression, anxiety, and impulse
control. (AR 862, 1495.) He also suffers from many physical
impairments, including a pulmonary embolism, deep vein
thrombosis, degenerative disc disease, ulnar nerve
neuropathy, carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS), and obesity.
Despite these impairments, in August 2016, Davis testified
that he regularly attends church (AR 2403),
“tinker[s]” on and fixes electronics for people
(AR 2405), and does chores around the house (id.).
He explained that he stopped working because his most recent
jobs were seasonal (AR 2406), because his employer
“didn't want to keep [him] on”
(id.), or because of his pulmonary embolism (AR
2407). Additionally, he explained that he
“[d]oesn't get along with . . . boss[es] telling
[him] what to do.” (Id.) He further testified
that he was thinking about going back to vocational
rehabilitation but was deterred because “they won't
help me until I get help myself.” (AR 2408.)
Procedural
Background
On
October 18, 2007, Davis filed applications for DIB and SSI,
alleging that, starting on June 30, 2003, he has been unable
to work due to emotional disorders and attention deficit
disorder. (AR 116.) He explained that he has difficulty
focusing at work, irritability, problems with relationships
and getting along with others, depression, impulsivity, and
paranoia. (Id.) Davis's applications were denied
initially and upon reconsideration, and he timely requested
an administrative hearing. The hearing was conducted on
December 14, 2009 by Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Ruth
Kleinfeld. (AR 1273-88.) On April 29, 2010, the ALJ issued a
decision finding that Davis was not disabled under the Social
Security Act at any time from his alleged disability onset
date through the date of the decision. (AR 4-21.) Davis
timely appealed that decision to the district court, and the
parties stipulated to a reversal and remand for a new hearing
and decision. On April 20, 2011, the Appeals Council remanded
the case with instructions. (AR 1160-66.)
On
December 7, 2011, a second administrative hearing was held
before ALJ Kleinfeld (AR 2471-2518), who issued a second
unfavorable decision on January 27, 2012 (AR 1179-1202).
Davis again appealed, and on June 13, 2012, the Appeals
Council vacated and remanded the ALJ's decision with
instructions. (AR 1171-75.)
On
September 30, 2013, a third administrative hearing was held,
this time before ALJ Thomas Merrill. (AR 2666-94.) On
December 13, 2013, ALJ Merrill issued a third unfavorable
decision. (AR 947-74.) Davis timely appealed the decision to
the district court, ultimately resulting in a June 3, 2015
Order from the Appeals Council remanding the case, yet again,
with instructions. (AR 2463-67.)
On
August 23, 2016 and October 12, 2016, respectively, fourth
and fifth hearings were held on Davis's claim, this time
before ALJ Dory Sutker. (AR 2379- 2410, 2412-61.) Medical
expert psychiatrist Dr. Nathan Strahl testified by telephone
at the October 2016 hearing. (AR 2423-50.) On January 3,
2017, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Davis had not
been disabled from his alleged disability onset date of June
30, 2003 through the date of the decision. (AR 2346-63.)
Thereafter, the Decision Review Board did not complete its
review of the claim during the time allowed, rendering the
ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner.
(AR 1-3.) Having exhausted his administrative remedies, Davis
filed the Complaint in this action on March 31, 2017. (Doc.
3.)
ALJ
Decision
The
Commissioner uses a five-step sequential process to evaluate
disability claims. See Butts v. Barnhart, 388 F.3d
377, 380-81 (2d Cir. 2004). The first step requires the ALJ
to determine whether the claimant is presently engaging in
“substantial gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If the claimant is not
so engaged, step two requires the ALJ to determine whether
the claimant has a “severe impairment.” 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If the ALJ finds that
the claimant has a severe impairment, the third step requires
the ALJ to make a determination as to whether that impairment
“meets or equals” an impairment listed in 20
C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (the Listings). 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). The claimant is
presumptively disabled if his or her impairment meets or
equals a listed impairment. Ferraris v. Heckler, 728
F.2d 582, 584 (2d Cir. 1984).
If the
claimant is not presumptively disabled, the ALJ is required
to determine the claimant's residual functional capacity
(RFC), which means the most the claimant can still do despite
his or her mental and physical limitations based on all the
relevant medical and other evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(e), 404.1545(a)(1), 416.920(e),
416.945(a)(1). The fourth step requires the ALJ to consider
whether the claimant's RFC precludes the performance of
his or her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(f), 416.920(f). Finally, at the fifth step, the ALJ
determines whether the claimant can do “any other
work.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g).
The claimant bears the burden of proving his or her case at
steps one through four, Butts, 388 F.3d at 383; and
at step five, there is a “limited burden shift to the
Commissioner” to “show that there is work in the
national economy that the claimant can do, ”
Poupore v. Astrue, 566 F.3d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 2009)
(clarifying that the burden shift to the Commissioner at step
five is limited, and the Commissioner “need not provide
additional evidence of the claimant's [RFC]”).
Employing
this sequential analysis in her January 3, 2017 decision, ALJ
Sutker first determined that Davis had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since his alleged disability
onset date of June 30, 2003. (AR 2349.) At step two, the ALJ
found that Davis had the following severe impairments:
recurrent idiopathic pulmonary embolism and deep vein
thrombosis, degenerative disc disease of the spine, ulnar
nerve neuropathy (left), CTS, obesity, dysthymic disorder,
anxiety disorder, a personality disorder, and a history of
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. (Id.)
Conversely, the ALJ found that Davis's pilonidal cyst,
esophageal reflux, and sleep apnea were non-severe
impairments. (AR 2351.) At step three, the ALJ found
that none of Davis's impairments, alone or in
combination, met or medically equaled a listed impairment.
(AR 2351-56.)
Next,
the ALJ determined that Davis had the RFC to perform light
work, as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and
416.967(b), except as follows:
[Davis] cannot climb ladders/ropes/scaffolds[, ] and he is
limited to occasional climbing of stairs/ramps, kneeling,
crouching, crawling[, ] and stooping. He needs to avoid
exposure to unprotected heights and to dangerous machinery.
He can perform uncomplicated tasks that typically can be
learned in 30 days or less. He can maintain concentration,
persistence[, ] and pace for such tasks for 2-hour blocks
throughout an 8hour workday with regular scheduled breaks and
lunch. He is limited to incidental contact with the general
public (dealing with the public is not part of his job
duties). He needs an environment where tasks are performed in
a solitary manner (no tandem or team tasks), but he is able
to collaborate with co[]workers and supervisors on routine
matters.
(AR 2356.) Given this RFC, the ALJ found that Davis was
unable to perform any of his past relevant work. (AR 2361.)
Finally, based on testimony from vocational expert Dr. Peter
Manzi, the ALJ determined that Davis could perform other jobs
existing in significant numbers in the national economy,
including the representative occupations of assembler of
hospital products, assembler of small products, and lens
matcher. (AR 2362.) The ALJ further found that, even if Davis
were limited to only frequent handling and fingering, he
could perform work as an assembler of hospital products, a
lens matcher, or a weld inspector. (Id.) The ...