United States District Court, D. Vermont
OPINION AND ORDER (DOCS. 10, 11, 20)
JOHN
M. CONROY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff
Amy P. brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
of the Social Security Act, requesting review and remand of
the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying
her applications for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) and
Supplemental Security Income (SSI). Pending before the Court
are Plaintiff's motion to reverse the Commissioner's
decision under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (Doc.
10), Plaintiff's motion to remand the Commissioner's
decision under sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (Doc.
11), and the Commissioner's motion to affirm the decision
and deny remand under sentence six (Doc. 20). For the reasons
stated below, Plaintiff's sentence four motion (Doc. 10)
is GRANTED; the Commissioner's motion (Doc. 20) is
DENIED; and the matter is REMANDED for further proceedings
and a new decision. Given these rulings, Plaintiff's
sentence six motion (Doc. 11) is DENIED as moot.
Background
Plaintiff
was 42 years old on her alleged disability onset date of
April 2, 2010. She has an associate's degree in nursing
and worked as a registered nurse for approximately ten years,
holding nursing jobs in the settings of a clinic, a visiting
nurse service, and a nursing home. Before becoming a nurse,
Plaintiff worked in retail fabric stores. She is divorced,
and has seven children ranging in age from approximately 15
to 30. She lost custody of her children shortly after she and
her ex-husband separated in 2010, and has had only limited
visitation with them since the divorce.
Plaintiff
grew up in Massachusetts with her parents, two brothers, and
two step-siblings. She had a traumatic childhood, mostly the
result of her parents both having mental health and substance
abuse problems. She was sexually assaulted by her father from
around the ages of 3 through 11, and also sexually assaulted
by one of her brothers when she was 13. Plaintiff married
when she was in her early twenties and had seven children
with her ex-husband. In 2010, she and her ex-husband
separated due to his emotional and physical abuse of her.
Their divorce followed, with Plaintiff losing primary custody
of the children. In March 2011, Plaintiff moved to Tunbridge,
Vermont with her boyfriend. As of January 2017, the couple
was engaged to be married.
Since
childhood, Plaintiff has suffered from depression, anxiety,
and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). She has also, at
times, carried diagnoses of bipolar disorder, attention
deficit hyperactivity disorder, and personality disorder. At
age 18, Plaintiff first entered psychotherapy for depression
and anxiety. She first entered a center for detoxification of
drugs and alcohol at age 19. And she was first treated with
antidepressant medication at age 24. Plaintiff has had
several hospital admissions--including in July 2009, November
2010, and September 2011--due to depression and/or alcohol
abuse, and has attempted suicide (by cutting and overdosing)
multiple times. In October 2013, after a charge of domestic
assault, the Vermont Department of Corrections, Probation and
Parole, mandated that Plaintiff attend a substance abuse
program. She thus attended outpatient substance abuse
treatment at the Clara Martin Center until around January
2015. Two years later, at the January 2017 administrative
hearing, Plaintiff testified that she drinks one or two beers
once or twice each week (AR 1439), and smokes about half a
pack of cigarettes each day (AR 1446).
In
addition to her mental impairments, Plaintiff also suffers
from gastrointestinal problems and asthma, among other
physical ailments. As of January 2017, her gastrointestinal
symptoms included feeling nauseous constantly, vomiting about
five times a day, and having chronic diarrhea. (AR 1442-43.)
In July
2012, Plaintiff filed applications for DIB and SSI. In her
disability application, she alleged that she has been unable
to work since April 2, 2010 due to depression, anxiety, PTSD,
an undiagnosed cardiac or neurological condition, and
irritable bowel syndrome (IBS). (AR 328.) Plaintiff testified
at the January 2017 hearing that, as a result of these
impairments, she does nothing all day, other than sitting at
the kitchen table looking out the window and checking
Facebook every four to six weeks. (AR 1444-45.) She further
testified that she does not tend to her own personal hygiene,
has no interests or hobbies, very rarely goes outside, and
does not see any friends. (Id.) She stated that she
misses a lot of medical appointments due to her impairments.
(AR 1444.)
Plaintiff's
applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration,
and she timely requested an administrative hearing. On March
17, 2014, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Thomas Merrill
conducted a hearing on the disability application. (AR
37-62.) Plaintiff appeared and testified, and was represented
by counsel. A vocational expert (VE) also testified at the
hearing. On May 5, 2014, the ALJ issued a decision finding
that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act
from her alleged disability onset date through the date of
the decision. (AR 16-28.) Thereafter, the Appeals Council
denied Plaintiff's request for review. On August 24,
2015, Plaintiff filed a Complaint with this Court, and the
matter was voluntarily remanded to the ALJ for further
proceedings and a new decision.
On
remand, the Appeals Council consolidated Plaintiff's July
2012 applications with a subsequent SSI application that was
filed in December 2015, and returned the case to the ALJ for
additional development of the record and a new decision. (AR
1491-93.) On January 11, 2017, a second administrative
hearing was held before ALJ Merrill. (AR 1434-58.) Plaintiff
again appeared and testified, and was represented by counsel.
A VE also testified, along with Plaintiff's
fiancé. On March 29, 2017, the ALJ issued a second
decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled under the
Social Security Act from her alleged disability onset date
through the date of the decision. (AR 1407-24.) Plaintiff
filed the Complaint in this action on June 6, 2017. (Doc. 3.)
ALJ
Decision
The
Commissioner uses a five-step sequential process to evaluate
disability claims. See Butts v. Barnhart, 388 F.3d
377, 380-81 (2d Cir. 2004). The first step requires the ALJ
to determine whether the claimant is presently engaging in
“substantial gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If the claimant is not
so engaged, step two requires the ALJ to determine whether
the claimant has a “severe impairment.” 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If the ALJ finds that
the claimant has a severe impairment, the third step requires
the ALJ to make a determination as to whether that impairment
“meets or equals” an impairment listed in 20
C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (“the
Listings”). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d),
416.920(d). The claimant is presumptively disabled if his or
her impairment meets or equals a listed impairment.
Ferraris v. Heckler, 728 F.2d 582, 584 (2d Cir.
1984).
If the
claimant is not presumptively disabled, the ALJ is required
to determine the claimant's residual functional capacity
(RFC), which means the most the claimant can still do despite
his or her mental and physical limitations based on all the
relevant medical and other evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(e), 404.1545(a)(1), 416.920(e),
416.945(a)(1). The fourth step requires the ALJ to consider
whether the claimant's RFC precludes the performance of
his or her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(f), 416.920(f). Finally, at the fifth step, the ALJ
determines whether the claimant can do “any other
work.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g).
The claimant bears the burden of proving his or her case at
steps one through four, Butts, 388 F.3d at 383; and
at step five, there is a “limited burden shift to the
Commissioner” to “show that there is work in the
national economy that the claimant can do, ”
Poupore v. Astrue, 566 F.3d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 2009)
(clarifying that the burden shift to the Commissioner at step
five is limited, and the Commissioner “need not provide
additional evidence of the claimant's [RFC]”).
Employing
this sequential analysis, ALJ Merrill first determined that,
although Plaintiff had worked for short periods since her
alleged disability onset date of April 2, 2010, she had not
engaged in substantial gainful activity during that period.
(AR 1410.) At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the
following severe impairments: major depressive disorder, a
personality disorder, and alcohol abuse disorder.
(Id.) Conversely, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's
cardiac or neurological condition, IBS, shoulder issues,
asthma, seizure activity, hypertension, diabetes, and
gastroesophageal reflux disease, were nonsevere. (AR
1410-11.) At step three, the ALJ determined that none of
Plaintiff's impairments, alone or in combination, met or
medically equaled a listed impairment. (AR 1412-16.)
Next,
the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform
“a full range of work at all exertional levels but with
the following nonexertional limitations: she can understand,
remember[, ] and carry out 1-4[-]step instructions for 2-hour
periods throughout an 8-hour day and a 40-hour week.”
(AR 1416.) Given this RFC, the ALJ found that, although
Plaintiff was unable to perform her past relevant work as a
registered nurse (AR 1422-23), there were other jobs existing
in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff
could perform, including the representative occupations of
receptionist, recreation attendant, and housecleaner (AR
1423). The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had not been under a
disability from the alleged disability onset date of April 2,
2010 through the date of the decision. (AR 1424.)
Standard
of Review
The
Social Security Act defines the term “disability”
as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(1)(A). A person will be found disabled only if it is
determined that his “impairments are of such severity
that he is not only unable to do his previous work[, ] but
cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience,
engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which
exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(2)(A).
In
considering a Commissioner's disability decision, the
court “review[s] the administrative record de
novo to determine whether there is substantial evidence
supporting the . . . decision and whether the Commissioner
applied the correct legal standard.” Machadio v.
Apfel, 276 F.3d 103, 108 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Shaw
v. Chater, 221 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 2000));
see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The court's factual
review of the Commissioner's decision is thus limited to
determining whether “substantial evidence” exists
in the record to support such decision. 42 U.S.C. §
405(g); Rivera v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 964, 967 (2d
Cir. 1991); see Alston v. Sullivan, 904 F.2d 122,
126 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Where there is substantial
evidence to support either position, the determination is one
to be made by the factfinder.”). “Substantial
evidence” is more than a mere scintilla; it means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v.
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