In re Ahmed M. Hamid-Ahmed
Original Jurisdiction Board of Bar Examiners Keith Kasper,
Chair
Ahmed
M. Hamid-Ahmed, Pro Se, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
Petitioner-Appellant.
Thomas
J. Donovan, Jr., Attorney General, and Eleanor L.P.
Spottswood, Assistant Attorney General, Montpelier, for
Respondent-Appellee.
PRESENT: Reiber, C.J., Skoglund, Robinson, Eaton and Carroll,
JJ.
SKOGLUND, J.
¶
1. Applicant, Ahmed M. Hamid-Ahmed, appeals a decision of the
Vermont Board of Bar Examiners (Board) denying his
application to take the Vermont bar exam. Because appellant
does not meet the requirements outlined in the Vermont Rules
of Admission to the Bar, we affirm.
¶
2. No material facts are in dispute. Applicant has a
bachelor's degree with a major in criminal justice and a
Master of Laws degree (LLM) from Widener University School of
Law. However, he does not have a Juris Doctor (JD) or a
substantially equivalent law degree from a foreign or
domestic non-approved law school, he has not enrolled in a
law office study program, and he has not been admitted to any
other bar, foreign or domestic. Despite this, applicant
argues that he is eligible to take the bar exam under Vermont
Rule of Admission to the Bar 8(c)(4)'s "curing
provision" by virtue of his LLM. He further argues that
the Board violated his due process rights when it denied his
application but did not explicitly notify him of the process
for appealing that decision to this Court.
¶
3. The Vermont Rules of Admission to the Bar lay out three
ways an applicant can satisfy the educational requirements
necessary to be eligible to sit for the bar exam: (a)
graduate from an approved law school, (b) complete the Law
Office Study Program, or (c) graduate from a non-approved law
school, if the equivalency requirements of Rule 8 are met.
V.R.A.B. 6. Rule 8 outlines the differing requirements when
the non-approved law school is within the United States and
outside the United States.
¶
4. If an applicant is a graduate from a foreign, non-approved
law school, they must meet the requirements of both Rule
8(b)(1) and (b)(2). Subsection (b)(1) requires the applicant
to establish that "he or she has . . . completed a legal
education at a Foreign Law School whose curriculum provided
training in a system based on the common law of England and
that is otherwise equivalent to graduation from an Approved
Law School, as determined by the equivalency determination
process." And, subsection (b)(2) requires the applicant
to have "been admitted to the bar of a court of general
jurisdiction in the country in which the Applicant attended
the Foreign Law School and [to have] maintained good standing
in that bar or resigned from that bar while still in good
standing."
¶
5. Subsection (c) of Rule 8, titled "Equivalency
Determination Process" and referenced in Rule 8(b)(1),
outlines the requirements an applicant must meet to show that
their graduation from a non-approved law school satisfies the
educational requirements. Within this subsection, there is a
"Cure Provision," which provides that
"[a]pplicants who do not meet the requirements of
paragraph (b)(1) of this rule, may cure deficiency by
obtaining an LLM degree . . . at an Approved Law School in
the United States." V.R.A.B. 8(c)(4).
¶
6. Applicant urges this Court to adopt a broad reading of
Rule 8(c)(4) to make the curing provision applicable to
everyone with an LLM applying to sit for the Vermont bar
exam, regardless of their legal educational and professional
background. This interpretation is contrary to the most basic
principles of statute and rule interpretation.
¶
7. It is an essentially universal practice to interpret
rules, regulations, and statutes based on the plain meaning
of the language when read in context of the text as a whole.
City of Burlington v. Dep't of Emp't &
Training, 148 Vt. 151, 154, 530 A.2d 573, 575 (1987)
(explaining that court must interpret statute as whole
"and if possible, give effect to every word, clause, and
sentence." (quotation omitted)). And, if the plain
meaning is clear on the face of the rule, it must be enforced
as such. See e.g., Heffernan v. State, 2018 VT 47,
¶ 7, Vt., 187 A.3d 1149 (noting that
"interpretation begins with the plain language" and
"if the language in question is clear," analysis
ends).
¶
8. Based on the plain meaning of its terms, Rule 8(c)(4)
allows those who graduated from a foreign law school to
"cure" the shortcomings of their foreign law
degree, which has provided inadequate preparation to practice
law in Vermont either because the degree was not based on the
common law of England or did not meet the other equivalency
requirements set forth in Rule 8(c)(1)-(3). To cure a
shortcoming in foreign law degree, an applicant must
have a foreign law degree and must also meet the
other requirements of Rule 8(b). Here, applicant does not
deny that he does not have a foreign law degree and that he
has not been admitted to another bar, either foreign or
domestic. Applicant's proposed interpretation of Rule
8(c)(4) is untenable when the plain language is read in the
context of Rule 8 and the remainder of the Vermont Rules of
Admission to the Bar, and thus the Board properly rejected it
and denied applicant's application to take the bar exam.
¶
9. Next, applicant argues that the Board violated his due
process rights when it denied his application but did not
explicitly notify him of the process for appealing that
decision to this Court. This Court has consistently held that
"a party's failure to present any substantive
analysis or argument on . . . constitutional issues
constitutes inadequate briefing, which we [will] decline to
address." Trudell v. State, 2013 VT 18, ¶
30, 193 Vt. 515, 71 A.3d 1235 (declining to address
appellant's argument because it consisted of one citation
to case law with no explanation or supporting analysis);
V.R.A.P. 28. And although we find applicant's briefing
insufficient, we nevertheless briefly address and dismiss his
argument. Because applicant suffered no prejudice from the
Board's failure to inform him of the appellate
procedures-he timely appealed to this Court and we have
rendered judgment on the merits-any alleged error resulting
from the Board's lack of notice was harmless and
therefore does not warrant reversal. Parker v.
Hoefer, 118 Vt. 1, 10-11, 100 A.2d 434, ...