United States District Court, D. Vermont
ENTRY ORDER ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATION AND DENYING MOTIONS FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOCS. 5, 40, 48, 57,
Geoffrey W. Crawford, U.S. District Court Chief Judge
March 2018, petitioner Clinton Bedell filed a petition for
writ of habeas corpus under 18 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 5.)
The case was automatically referred to United States
Magistrate Judge John Conroy pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1) and Local Rule 73(f). The Petitioner is
addition to the § 2254 habeas petition, Petitioner filed
a letter seeking a transport order and requesting the court
order his transport to a Vermont prison. (Doc. 40.) On
October 2, 2018, the magistrate judge issued his Report and
Recommendation concerning the habeas petition and motion for
transport order. The magistrate judge recommended denial of
both motions. (Doc. 48.) Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 72, Petitioner's objection was signed on
October 28, 2018. (Doc. 50.) On February 13, 2019, Petitioner
filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 57) to which
Respondent Lisa Menard did not respond, and, on February 27,
2019, he filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 60).
Menard's response to the summary judgment motion is due
April 1, 2019.
district judge must make a de novo determination of
those portions of a magistrate judge's report and
recommendation to which an objection is made. Fed R. Civ. P.
72(b)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Cullen v. United
States, 194 F.3d 401, 405 (2d Cir. 1999). The district
judge may "accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in
part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate
judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); accord
Cullen, 194 F.3d at 405.
magistrate judge determined that Petitioner's habeas
petition is barred by the statute of limitations (Doc. 48 at
11-16) and, alternatively, it fails to establish that
Petitioner's conviction violated federal law,
id. at 16-27. The magistrate judge therefore
recommends the court deny the petition. He further recommends
Petitioner's motion for injunctive relief brought under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 be denied for failure to state a claim
on which relief can be granted. Id. at 27-30.
filed a handwritten "motion in opposition"
consisting of argument, an attached list of case citations,
and annotations on the first six pages of the Report and
Recommendation. He makes several arguments: The case law he
provides "proves both an ineffectual non-voluntary plea,
and that the version of title 13 V.S.A. § 3252(b) in the
year 1996 the time of alleged crime is a statute that is
unconstitutional as written and as applied ... making the
State's claimed plea on that repealed statute an invalid
conviction." (Doc. 50 at 1.) The plea was involuntary
because he said "I do not understand" when asked in
court. Id. The sentence length is unconstitutional.
And tolling applies because he sent a DNA test to this court
establishing "actual innocence." Id.; see also
Id. at 4 (noting that he "did not impregnate [his]
daughter but even if [he] had 'procreation' is a ...
also includes "affidavits" throughout the filing.
• "the transcript of Feb 5 1999 ... is a complete
lie, twisting words and . .. leaving parts out" (Doc. 50
• "I did not plea to [13 V.S.A. §] 3252(b)(2)
and said in the transcript I do not understand,"
id, at 2;
• "I. . . swallowed a full bottle of pills and was
not body free of drugs," id. at 4;
• "In open court I. . . rejected the written plea
forever," id. at 5;
• "I did not reverse my decision to reject the plea
forever I was only in court because I was promised all
charges .. . were to be dismissed," id.;
• "I swear I had no change of heart,"
• "Less than 18 hours prior I had attempted suicide
swallowing a full bottle of Percocet and the State had no
formal competency hearing to evaluate [my] ...