United States District Court, D. Vermont
OPINION AND ORDER (DOCS. 30, 47, 54, 56, 57, &
65)
John
M. Conroy United States Magistrate Judge
On
January 9, 2019, proceeding pro se, Plaintiff
Jacqueline Reynolds filed an Amended Complaint in the present
civil action, alleging that Defendants Elizabeth Demas, Esq.,
and Bruce D. Baker, Esq., committed professional legal
malpractice in multiple ways. (Doc. 3 at 11–25,
¶¶ 25–73.) The gravamen of these claims is
that Attorneys Demas and Baker committed legal malpractice in
their representation of Reynolds in a partition action
brought against Jane Scanlon in Vermont Superior Court.
(Id.) Reynolds seeks total damages in excess of
$800, 000, including expenses, and 12% interest from 2006 to
2015. (Id. at 25–26, ¶¶
75–76.)
Presently
before the Court is Demas and Baker’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. 30) and several other pending motions
submitted by both parties. (See Docs. 47, 54, 56,
57, 65.) Oral argument was held on September 16, 2019. For
the reasons set forth below, Demas and Baker’s Motion
for Summary Judgment (Doc. 30) is GRANTED, and
Reynolds’s motions to extend time to retain an expert
(Docs. 47, 65) are DENIED. Further, because the Court grants
the Motion for Summary Judgment, the pending motions filed
after the summary judgment motion are DENIED as moot. (Docs.
54, 56, 57.)
Factual
Background
The
material facts are primarily drawn from Reynolds’s
Amended Complaint (Doc. 3), the documents Reynolds submitted
with her Amended Complaint (Docs. 3-1–3-52), and the
documents filed by Demas and Baker in support of their Motion
for Summary Judgment. (Docs. 30-1–30-9.) They are
undisputed unless otherwise indicated.
I.
Reynolds’s Loans to Jane Scanlon
Reynolds
met Jane Scanlon online sometime in February 2006. (Doc. 3 at
3, ¶ 13.) At the time, Reynolds lived in Texas and
Scanlon lived in Vermont. (See Doc. 3-8 at 3,
¶¶ 13–14.) Apparently, after Reynolds and
Scanlon met, Reynolds began traveling from Texas to stay with
Scanlon in Vermont. (Id.)
Approximately
three months after they met, Reynolds allegedly loaned
Scanlon $1, 000. (Doc. 3. at 3, ¶ 13.) About a month
later, Reynolds and Scanlon discussed forming a joint
business to rent the rooms of Scanlon’s house, located
at 21 Messenger Street in St. Albans, Vermont. (Id.
¶ 14.) Scanlon conducted preliminary research to
determine whether such a business would be a good investment.
(Id.) Unbeknownst to Reynolds, however, the Franklin
County Vermont Superior Court had previously issued an order
on October 4, 2005 appointing an agent to sell the property
at 21 Messenger Street and to apportion the proceeds between
Scanlon and her ex-husband in accordance with their divorce
decree. (Doc. 3-5.)
According
to Reynolds, it was not until several months later that
Scanlon told Reynolds that Scanlon owed her ex-husband
approximately $15, 000 and that the Franklin County Superior
Court had ordered the sale of 21 Messenger Street to satisfy
the debt. (Doc. 3 at 4, ¶ 16.) In August 2006 (Doc. 3-8
at 3, ¶ 15), to prevent the sale of 21 Messenger Street,
Reynolds agreed to loan nearly $16, 600 to Scanlon to satisfy
the debt, as well as the interest that had accrued and the
fees due to the agent tasked with selling the
property.[1] (Doc. 3 at 5–6, ¶¶
16–17; see also Doc. 3-7.) Subsequently,
Reynolds claims that she provided Scanlon with an additional
check for $3, 500 in full satisfaction of the remaining
claims against Scanlon. (Id.; see also Doc.
3-9.) In total, Reynolds asserts that she “loaned Ms.
Scanlon over ($20, 000.00) regarding the divorce decree
settlement of Ms. Scanlon and her former husband.”
(Doc. 3 at 5–6, ¶ 17.) To secure this loan,
Reynolds and Scanlon executed a promissory note for $22, 000
on August 8, 2006 (Promissory Note A). (See Doc.
3-11 at 5.) Under the terms of Promissory Note A, Scanlon
agreed to a 7% interest rate on the loan, with the entire
amount due on October 8, 2006. (Id.) If the funds
were not available on October 8, Scanlon agreed to sell the
property at 21 Messenger Street to pay the outstanding loan.
(Id.)
Apparently,
sometime after Reynolds made these loans, she and Scanlon
entered into a verbal business agreement to rent rooms at 21
Messenger Street. (Doc. 3 at 6–7, ¶ 18.) Reynolds
agreed to provide money to repair and update the property for
guests and Scanlon was designated to collect rental payments;
Reynolds and Scanlon also decided to split the rental
payments equally and to reinvest the rental payments into the
property where required. (Id.) As part of their
discussion, Scanlon also agreed to execute a quitclaim deed
giving Reynolds a 50% interest in 21 Messenger Street.
(Id.) Reynolds states that she fulfilled her
monetary obligations under the agreement and, by December
2006, Scanlon had found a renter for 21 Messenger Street.
(Id. at 8–9, ¶ 22.) On April 19, 2007,
Scanlon fulfilled her portion of the agreement by executing a
quitclaim deed providing Reynolds with a 50% interest in 21
Messenger Street. (Id.; see also Doc. 3-11
at 7–8.)
At the
same time that Reynolds and Scanlon were engaged in their
business venture, Reynolds states that she provided Scanlon
with two additional personal loans. First, on October 24,
2006, Reynolds loaned Scanlon $24, 500. (Doc. 3 at 7, ¶
20.) Then, in approximately March 2007, Reynolds loaned
Scanlon an additional $31, 500. (Id. at 7–8,
¶ 21.) Reynolds maintains that both payments were
personal loans to Scanlon and were not financial
contributions to the rental business at 21 Messenger Street.
(Id. at 7–8, ¶¶ 20–21.) To
secure payment for these loans, Reynolds and Scanlon signed a
second promissory note (Promissory Note B) on April 19,
2007.[2] (Id. at 8, ¶ 21; see
also Doc. 3-11 at 6.) Under the terms of Promissory Note
B, Scanlon agreed to a 7% interest rate on the loan, with the
entire amount due that fall, specifically on October 8, 2007.
(See Doc. 3-11 at 6.) If the funds were not
available on October 8, Scanlon again agreed to sell the
property at 21 Messenger Street to pay the outstanding loan.
(Id.)
From
summer 2008 to spring 2012, Reynolds apparently attempted to
informally recover the amounts loaned to Scanlon, but Scanlon
failed to repay the loans. (Doc. 3 at 9, ¶ 23.) Then, in
May 2013, Reynolds contacted a realtor in Vermont to ask
about the possibility of selling 21 Messenger Street,
apparently so that she could recover the loan amounts and
rental income. (Id. at 9–10, ¶ 24.)
Ultimately, the realtor suggested that Reynolds contact
Attorney Demas for advice regarding the possible sale of 21
Messenger Street and about the loan obligations owed by
Scanlon. (Id.)
II.
Demas’s Representation of Reynolds
In July
2013, Reynolds hired Attorney Demas to seek partition of 21
Messenger Street, to recover 50% of any unpaid rental income
held by Scanlon, and to seek repayment of the outstanding
loans provided to Scanlon. (Doc. 3 at 11–13, ¶
27.) From the beginning, however, Attorney Demas recommended
that Reynolds attempt to settle the case, because “the
court process to quiet this title, or partition the property,
could take years, would cost thousands of dollars, and may
well end up with you back at the point of only owning half of
the property.” (Doc. 3-52.)
Subsequently,
in October 2013, on behalf of Reynolds, Attorney Demas filed
a complaint against Scanlon in the Franklin County Superior
Court. (See Doc. 3-11.) In the complaint, Demas
asked the superior court to partition the property at 21
Messenger Street so that Reynolds could recover $94, 625.20
purportedly owed by Scanlon and so that Reynolds could be
awarded an undivided 50% interest in the property.
(Id. at 1, ¶ 4.) With regard to the amount
demanded, Demas alleged in the complaint that Reynolds
advanced Scanlon a total of $101, 625.20 between February
2006 and March 2012 and that Reynolds had repaid only $7, 000
of that amount. (Id. at 1, ¶ 5.) For support,
Demas attached Promissory Note A, alleging that the note
reflected a debt of $35, 500, and Promissory Note B, which
purportedly represented a debt of $66, 125.20. (Id.
at 2, ¶¶ 6–7.) But the sums set forth in the
attached promissory notes did not match the sums demanded in
the complaint;[3]instead, as described in detail above,
Promissory Note A secured a loan of $22, 000 and Promissory
Note B secured a loan of $56, 000. (See Id . at
5–6.)
After
filing the complaint, Attorney Demas emailed Reynolds to let
her know the next steps in the process. (See Doc.
3-26 at 4.) In her email, Demas expressed her hope that the
complaint “would generate settlement
discussions.” (Id.) Demas also explained that
she would “try to get as much money for [Reynolds] as
possible in court, and the judge can award as much as we can
document [that Scanlon] borrowed.” (Id.)
In
December 2013, Scanlon filed an answer and counterclaim,
alleging that both Promissory Note B and the quitclaim deed
were frauds. (Doc. 3-8 at 1–2, ¶ 7; id.
at 3–5, ¶¶ 19, 21–28.) With regard to
Promissory Note A, Scanlon admitted that Reynolds advanced
Scanlon $16, 000 to help finalize Scanlon’s divorce and
that Scanlon subsequently executed Promissory Note A.
(Id. at 3, ¶¶ 15–18.)
On
January 8, 2014, Attorney Demas forwarded the answer and
counterclaim to Reynolds, noting that Scanlon’s
allegations were “serious, ” and on February 10,
2014, she requested that Reynolds provide the original
versions of the promissory notes to rebut the claims of
fraud.[4] (See Doc. 3-27; Doc. 3-28.) Later
that month, Reynolds provided Attorney Demas with the
originals of the quitclaim deed and Promissory Note A, but
did not produce an original version of Promissory Note B.
(See Doc. 3-27; see also Doc. 30-1 at 5,
¶ 22.)
Scheduling
discovery and pretrial matters then became difficult for the
parties. (See Doc. 3-42.) Eventually, in early
November 2014, Demas and Scanlon’s attorney agreed to
schedule depositions and to mediate the case. (Doc. 3-39.) To
prepare for the depositions and mediation, a paralegal from
Attorney Demas’s office offered to explain the process
to Reynolds, but the extent of ...